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Abstract 
The history of the philosophy of thought experiments has touched on the work of Kuhn, 
Popper, Duhem, Mach, Lakatos, and other big names of the 20th century. But so far, almost 
nothing has been written about Paul Feyerabend. His most influential work was Against 
Method, 8 chapters of which concern a case study of Galileo with a significant focus on 
Galileo’s thought experiments. In addition, the later Feyerabend was interested in what might 
be called the epistemology of drama, including stories and myths. This paper brings these 
different aspects of Feyerabend’s work together in an attempt to present what might have 
been his considered views on scientific thought experiments. According to Feyerabend, TEs 
are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and instigate a new one 
through the use of propaganda to change our habits, by appealing to our sense of what is 
interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent and surprising. I conclude by 
contrasting Feyerabend’s ideas with two modern currents in the debate surrounding thought 
experiments: 1) the claim that the epistemology of thought experiments is just the 
epistemology of deductive or inductive arguments, and 2) the claim that the specifically 
narrative quality of thought experiments must be taken into account if we want a complete 
epistemology of thought experiments. 
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Introduction 
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) has been dismissed as a “clown” (see Munévar  1991, ix), an 
“enfant terrible” (Suppe 1991, 297), and the “worst enemy of science” (Theocharis and 
Psimopoulos 1987), someone who defends voodoo and astrology, attacks strawpeople, misses 
the point (see Shaw 2017) and is a postmodernist (Reaven 2000, 23; see Kidd 2016). Others 
appreciate him as “one of the most exciting philosophers of science of this century” (Munévar 
1991, ix), someone who played a crucial role in the development of ideas that we now take for 
granted in HPS, including pluralism, the disunity and value-ladenness of science, topics in 
feminist philosophy of science (see Brown and Kidd 2016, 2) and green philosophy (Naess 
1991). 
Feyerabend wasn’t always an unreliable narrator, but he was a narrator. He tells stories, and 
claims to be a philosopher only in the sense in which dogs can be philosophers (1991, 509; 
1995, 162). Some argue he has no positive philosophy at all (e.g., Dierderich 1991, 216), and 
even Feyerabend had trouble pinning himself down on key issues (1995, 145). Then again, 
according to Feyerabend, “pinning down” is something only “deep thinkers” do when they 
want to get stuck in the academic mud (1975, 53). In any case, there are still many 
unharvested philosophical fruits in Feyerabend, especially in his later work. Two specific 
areas that need more attention are Feyerabend’s comments on metaphilosophy, and the 
epistemological purposes he sees for drama (Brown and Kidd 2016, 7). This paper hopes to 
pursue both of these by attempting to locate Feyerabend’s views on thought experiments. 
Thought experiments (TEs) are tools of the imagination used to make epistemological 
progress in philosophy and science (making them relevant for metaphilosophy), and they 
typically have a narrative structure (making them relevant for an analysis of the 
epistemological use of drama). 
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The next section argues that it is fair to discuss Feyerabend as someone who had views about 
TEs, despite rarely having used that term in his published work. Following this, I try to 
reconstruct Feyerabend’s views on scientific TEs by considering his comments on the 
epistemological impact of stories and story-telling. Specifically, I read Feyerabend’s early 
remarks on Galileo’s TE in Against Method through the lens of his work published in the 90s, 
especially Killing Time and The Tyranny of Science.1 In section 3, I put Feyerabend into 
conversation with current trends in the literature on TEs. 
1 Feyerabend and TEs 
Feyerabend didn’t use the term “thought experiment” very often in published work: it appears 
only in the following instances. First, there is an approving reference to Ernst Mach’s (1897) 
discussion of Stevin’s inclined prism TE (Feyerabend 1987, 706-7): “it is entirely reasonable 
to correct and perhaps even to suspend the results of [laboratory] experiments” in favour of 
the output of a TE. He also applied the label in passing to some TEs in quantum mechanics 
(1968, 319; 1991a, 28), and said of Wheeler’s delayed choice TE that it “reeks of High 
Science” (1996, 28). 
Despite not using the term “thought experiment” often, there are several reasons to treat 
Feyerabend’s published work as being relevant to a discussion of them. Feyerabend is perhaps 
best known for his 1975 book Against Method, especially for its “epistemological anarchism” 
expressed in the catchphrase, “anything goes.” Of its 20 chapters, 8 focus on Galileo’s role in 
the Copernican revolution.2 While Feyerabend doesn’t use the term “thought experiment” in 
                                                     
1 I present Feyerabend’s ideas here without defending them. For a philosophical defense of 
some of them see (Stuart forthcoming). 
2 In Against Method, Feyerabend summarizes “anything goes” this way: “all methodologies, 
even the most obvious ones, have their limits” (23). In Tyranny of Science the claim is even 
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Against Method, he claims that “many of [Galileo’s] ‘experiences’ or ‘experiments’ used in 
the arguments about the motion of the earth are entirely fictitious” (1975, 75).3 These 
‘experiments’ are important because it is by means of them that “the transition from a 
geostatic cosmology to the point of view of Copernicus and Kepler is achieved” (1975, 75-6; 
emphasis removed). 
As examples of such ‘experiments,’ Feyerabend includes Galileo’s narratives about objects 
falling from the top of a tower and from a ship’s mast. Feyerabend seems to believe that 
Galileo didn’t really perform these experiments. Rather, they are meant to invent new 
imaginary experiences (1975, 65, 121). If this is so, they sound quite a bit like TEs.4 
                                                     
more general, “anything goes” “means only ‘don’t restrict your imagination’ because a very 
silly idea can lead to a very solid result” (2011, 130-131). 
3 Perhaps Feyerabend uses cognates like “fictitious experiments” and “invented experiences” 
instead of “TE” because he thinks they sound better. Perhaps he is following Mach (someone 
Feyerabend admired very much), who called TEs by many names, including “instinctive 
[instinktiven] experiments,” “thought-guided [Denken geleiteten] experiments” (134), 
“planned [planmäßig eingeleiteten] experiments,” “thought experiences 
[Gedankenerfahrung]” (136) and “phantasies [das Phantasieren]” (144). Or perhaps 
Feyerabend was accustomed to the term Gedankenexperiment used in the context of 
Einstein’s TEs, and had something more general in mind. 
4 There is a long history of discussion concerning whether Galileo really did perform the 
experiments that were attributed to him, perhaps beginning with Stillman Drake and 
Alexandre Koyré. For a recent evaluation of the relationship between Galileo’s TEs and 
physically performed experiments, see Palmieri (2018). 
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Galileo’s fictitious experiments do intuitively feel like TEs. For example, Feyerabend quotes 
at length “a certain fantasy which passed through [Galileo’s] imagination” concerning a ship 
voyage (1975, 65-7). If you sailed from Venice to Alexandretta holding a pen steady the 
whole time, the pen’s tip would trace the shape of an arc (since the earth is round). If instead 
you spent the trip doodling, the tip of the pen would still (roughly) trace an arc through space, 
even though someone standing beside you would only see the doodle. The difference is that 
when the arc-motion is shared by you, the pen, the paper, and your witnesses, that motion is 
“inoperative”: it’s not noticed. From a different perspective, say, from someone on the shore, 
both motions would be noticed. Perhaps because this story and similar ones have an 
experimental feel, they are labelled and discussed as paradigm cases of TEs (e.g., Brown 
2013, 54; Budden 1998; McAllister 2004, 1169). 
This has led philosophers to interpret Feyerabend as having views on TEs. Thus Michael 
Bishop attributes to Feyerabend the view that TEs are only psychological tricks (1998, 28). 
Bishop argues that TEs can be more than mere rhetoric, and indeed can assist us in the 
rational assessment of scientific theories. Feyerabend could certainly agree that this is a 
possible use for TEs; nowhere does he suggest that TEs work by trickery only, just that they 
can (and sometimes should) employ trickery.  
In a different vein, Richard Arthur extends Feyerabend’s analysis of Galileo’s tower TE to his 
falling bodies TE in order to argue that these TEs provide a priori knowledge by changing our 
“natural interpretations” (Arthur 1999) . I will not discuss Arthur’s main point, which 
concerns whether the knowledge produced by TEs is a priori or otherwise, but I will follow 
Arthur in thinking that natural interpretations are important for a discussion of Feyerabend 
and TEs. 
Finally, and most importantly, there is a letter from Feyerabend to Kuhn (reprinted in 
Hoyningen-Huene 2006) providing comments on a draft of what would become Kuhn’s 1964 
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paper on TEs. Feyerabend calls Kuhn’s paper “extremely illuminating” (2006, 630), but he 
sharply criticizes Kuhn for comparing scientific TEs to the puzzles and examples used by 
ordinary language philosophers (“OLPs”). In his criticism, Feyerabend emphasizes the 
difference between OLPs (“a bunch of Ignoramuses”) and scientists, whose TEs “proceeded 
to a recasting of our ways of thinking about nature.” The scientist realizes that “ordinary 
means of expression” are insufficient for many problems. The need to revise language can be 
“presented, most clearly, in an imaginary experiment,” which enables the scientist to “tear 
down large pieces of common idiom and to replace it by what at first sight will seem a fairly 
artificial idiom, but what as a matter of fact will be much more adequate.” Thus, for the 
scientist, “a thought experiment is a starting point of the revision of language.” For OLPs it’s 
the opposite: “the purpose is not revision of language, but realization that, properly 
understood, the language one is talking can already take care of the situation” (630). This 
typically requires “a kind of swindle” (631). Feyerabend insists that a comparison of Stevin’s 
inclined plane to one of the TEs of the OLPs would “most convincingly show the tremendous 
advantage of the ‘Galilean method’ of revision as opposed to the other method of talking 
around and around the problem until one has lost track of it” (631).  
We can take from this that Feyerabend respects scientific thought experiments as something 
which may help us recast our thoughts about nature, by, or in conjunction with, a revision of 
language. Feyerabend names TEs as things that can achieve these goals, and this is precisely 
what Galileo’s TEs are credited with in Against Method. So, I conclude that it is fair to 
discuss Feyerabend in the context of TEs.  
In the next section I will argue for a new interpretation of Feyerabend’s views: TEs are a kind 
of story. Stories, which have an undeserved negative reputation, can solidify into myths, 
which can be dogmatic and harmful. Despite the genealogical connection between stories and 
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myths, stories can be used to overturn harmful myths. And TEs in science can be extremely 
powerful versions of this kind of story.5 
2 Stories, Myths and Thought Experiments 
Stories 
In his 1995 autobiography, Killing Time, Feyerabend speaks approvingly about those who use 
narrative rather than argument to convey ideas (e.g., 1995, 103, 142). And he claims that one 
reason he continued to teach philosophy is because he likes telling stories (1995, 162). A 
general theme of the later Feyerabend is that, fundamentally, stories are all that we have, since 
truth is always mediated by its packaging. Stories may assume different forms, including 
epics, poems, lampoons, scientific prose, dramas, political speeches, novels, shorts stories and 
dialogues (1991b, 493). But for the later Feyerabend, all communication is story telling, so 
“why not avoid the fraud by using stories right away?” (1995, 163). 
Importantly, this is not to equate science with fiction. Stories are “not just poetic playthings.” 
Rather, they can be used to inform and criticize (1991b, 493). Stories can reveal true things 
about the world, and our desire for such stories is a major driving force of epistemic progress. 
                                                     
5 If I’m wrong, my interpretation of Feyerabend can be taken as a new story, which might be 
independently interesting. This is a strategy Feyerabend would have approved of, since this is 
exactly how he views his own remarks about Galileo. “If my account of Galileo is historically 
correct, then the argument stands as formulated. If it turns out to be a fairy-tale, then this 
fairy-tale tells us that a conflict between reason and the preconditions of progress is possible, 
it indicates how it might arise, and it forces us to conclude that our chances to progress may 
be obstructed by our desire to be rational” (1975, 117). 
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Thus, the sciences tell stories about the world in the same way that the humanities tell stories 
about who we are, how we got here, and what we should do. 
Not all stories are equally good. Good stories are those that are interesting, appealing, and 
revealing. Stories are interesting and appealing when they describe “perfectly ordinary 
situations” in a way that is “slightly off center.” This may be affected by a sudden change in 
framing or point of view, which helps us to combine objects and events we are comfortable 
with, in ways that reveal new things (1995, 142). To craft a good story, we begin with a 
general idea. Then we add words and rhythm, whose “meaning must be slightly off center; 
nothing dulls the mind as thoroughly as a sequence of familiar notions. Then comes the story. 
It should be interesting and comprehensible, and it should have some unusual twists…The 
elements hang together beautifully, but the argument itself is from outer space, as it were, 
unless it is connected with the lives and interests of individuals or special groups. Of course, it 
is always so connected, otherwise it would not be understood, but the connection is 
concealed” (1995, 163). 
This passage identifies several more conditions for a good story: comprehensibility, 
coherence and surprisingness. It is important to recognize that because of these conditions, 
one story cannot be objectively better or worse than another because some of the success 
conditions of stories are audience-dependent. No one story will be equally interesting and 
appealing to people from every cognitive-cultural background.6 
                                                     
6 When Feyerabend started teaching students at Berkeley who were not European or Anglo-
American, he realized that the “wonderful stories I had so far told…might just be dreams, 
reflections of the conceit of a small group who had succeeded in enslaving everyone else with 
their ideas” (1975, 264). 
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So, stories may come in different forms, with different goals, and some of those goals can be 
epistemic. Importantly, attempts at clarification render them lifeless. For example, the stories 
of philosophers “are hardly stories any longer.” They “use abstract and emotionally 
decontaminated concepts…not to sharpen our vision or to enrich our existence but to push us 
into narrow and dark passages. Feelings, impressions, desires can enter the debate only after 
they have been caught like butterflies, killed and stretched out on some philosophical rack.” 
The problem is that “philosophers, rationalists especially, are interested in general principles, 
not in particulars. Considering the richness of our world this means that their stories will be 
either empty, or tyrannical; people must mutilate their lives to fit the stories. (1991b, 494) 
For Feyerabend, when stories become “tyrannical,” they become myths.  
Myths 
A myth is a story that has been frozen into dogma. For Feyerabend, the Third Reich is a myth 
in the same sense that the superiority of Western Science is a myth. Myths are stories that we 
take for granted. They are no longer “alive” and changeable.  
The complete absence of myth in modern society is not possible. But this is not necessarily 
lamentable, as competition between myths can increase our knowledge. “Knowledge…is…an 
ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-
tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all 
of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of our 
consciousness” (1975, 11). 
And individual myths may themselves contain some truth. Feyerabend writes, “far from being 
a figment of the imagination that is clearly opposed to what is known to be the real world a 
myth is…a system of thought supported by numerous and very direct and forceful 
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experiences…There must be something amiss with the fairly popular idea that the distinction 
between a myth and a scientific theory lies in the factual basis of the latter” (1961, 23). 
Thus, myths can be empirically supported,7 and their interaction with competing myths can 
drive epistemic progress. The danger comes when we have an entire community that is 
subjugated under a single myth. This is the “myth predicament,” and overcoming it is not just 
epistemologically important, it is morally right. “Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a 
rigid church, for the frightened or greedy victims of some (ancient, or modern) myth, or for 
the weak and willing followers of some tyrant. Variety of opinion is necessary for objective 
knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible 
with a humanitarian outlook” (1975, 31-2).8 Stories can express theories and points of view, 
but they are not themselves points of view or theories. These escape the stories to become 
myths, which are no longer just stories (1975, 29). 
Mythical monism requires conformism, which “leads to a deterioration of intellectual 
capabilities, of the power of the imagination. It destroys the most precious gift of the young, 
their tremendous power of imagination” (1975, 96-7). To keep a myth dominant, monists 
rebrand “childlike” questions as “intellectual pains” which they are “apt to dismiss as 
‘imagination’” (1975, 131). The “tyranny of science” that Feyerabend often refers to is in 
many ways a tyranny of the imagination. Thus, “‘teachers’ using grades and the fear of failure 
mould the brains of the young until they have lost every ounce of imagination they might 
                                                     
7 See also Feyerabend’s arguments in “Problems of Empiricism” (1965), in which Feyerabend 
argues that empiricism does not have the resources to distinguish between myth and scientific 
theory. Thanks to Jamie Shaw for bringing this to my attention. 
8 See Preston (1997 ch. 5) for a careful discussion of the role of the myth predicament in 
Feyerabend’s philosophy. 
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once have possessed. This is a disastrous situation, and one not easily mended…We must stop 
the scientists from taking over education and from teaching as ‘fact’ and as ‘the one true 
method’ whatever the myth of the day happens to be. Agreement with science, decision to 
work in accordance with the canons of science should be the result of examination and choice, 
and not of a particular way of bringing up children” (1975, 160-162). 
This dulling of imagination is epistemically and morally deleterious (1975, 11), especially 
since, as we will see, imagination is an important link between myths, stories, and epistemic 
progress in science.9  
Sometimes a myth naturally crumbles from the inside, or is forgotten. But other times the only 
way to undermine a myth is by seeing the myth from the outside. We gain an outside 
perspective by inventing stories that may become competing myths. This is the core of 
Feyerabend’s “principle of proliferation,” which states that “the validity, usefulness, adequacy 
of popular standards can be checked only by research that violates them” (1975, 234). This 
requires imagination, because we must invent stories about other ways the world might be. 
Galileo, for instance, uses tricks to obscure the fact “that the experience on which Galileo 
wants to base the Copernican view is nothing but the result of his own fertile imagination” 
(1975, 65 emphasis added). 
One we have imagined a new story capable of transforming into an attractive worldview, we 
must then support it with evidence and arguments. To do this effectively might take decades 
                                                     
9 This is presaged by Vico, who claimed that education which emulates the “geometrical 
method” of physics (1709, 21) “benumbs...[the] imagination and stupefies...[the] memory” 
(1709, 42). Feyerabend was aware of Vico, since he mentions him in a letter to Lakatos on 24 
September 1970 (reprinted in Motterlini 1999, 216), but I have no evidence that he knew of 
this particular idea. 
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or centuries. Because of this, Feyerabend endorses a “principle of tenacity” to complement his 
principle of proliferation. The principle of tenacity tells us that we need to agree on a theory 
(myth) to get work done in science, so we should pick one that has “the most attractive 
features and that promises to lead to the most fruitful results” (Preston 1997, 138). Once 
we’ve chosen a new story, the principle tells us that we should stick with it, for example, by 
not discarding it when presented with refuting evidence. “It is rational to do so because 
theories are capable of development, can be improved, and may eventually be able to 
accommodate the difficulties which they were originally incapable of explaining” (Preston 
1997, 95). 
The principle of tenacity also requires imagination: “theoretical frameworks need to be 
detailed and criticized and reformulated. The endorsement of tenacity allows scientists to 
violate any of the reasons methodologists have given for rejecting theories (recalcitrant facts, 
logical inconsistencies, lack of theoretical virtues, etc.) because the theory can evolve to 
become highly successful in any way one construes ‘successful’” (Shaw 2017, 15). 
In sum, a dominant myth is morally and epistemologically problematic because it stifles our 
imaginations, which makes us less human and less able to proliferate tenaciously. TEs are 
tools that amplify the power of the imagination, allowing us to fight back. 
Thought Experiments 
If TEs are stories, they can make us more tenacious, improve our language, and much else. 
But the main function of stories that I will discuss, because of its centrality to Feyerabend, is 
that which allows us to proliferate “as the only efficient antidote against dogmatism” 
(Hoyningen-Huene 1994, 290). 
Galileo’s TEs “defused an important argument against the idea of the motion of the earth. I 
say ‘defused’, and not ‘refuted’, because we are dealing with a changing conceptual system as 
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well as with certain attempts at concealment” (1975, 55). They did this by changing our 
“natural interpretations.” A natural interpretation is a mental operation that we perform on a 
sensation, which occurs so naturally and automatically that we barely notice we’re doing it. 
For example, when we re-interpret what appears to be a bent stick in the water as a straight 
stick, we are applying a natural interpretation. 
Natural interpretations partially determine our experience and therefore our evidence about 
the world. Thus they are relevant to our knowledge claims, and must be investigated just as 
the reliability of our scientific instruments must be. But it is impossible to have a sensation 
without an accompanying natural interpretation. So how can we investigate them? There is 
only one way: an “external measure of comparison” that we achieve by inventing new natural 
interpretations (1975, 61). For example, “the Copernican view is not in accordance with ‘the 
facts’. Seen from the point of view of these ‘facts’, the idea of the motion of the earth is 
outlandish, absurd, and obviously false, to mention only some of the expressions…still heard 
whenever professional squares confront a new and counter-factual theory…Let us therefore 
turn the argument around and use it as a detecting device that helps us to discover the natural 
interpretations which exclude the motion of the earth…We first assert the motion of the earth 
and then inquire what changes will remove the contradiction” (1975, 61). 
This is Feyerabend’s famous “counterinduction,” in which we take a hypothesis that we 
believe is false, and try to find evidence for it. This is necessary because natural 
interpretations determine what we experience and what we take to be true. This is why “we 
need a dream-world in order to discover the features of the real world…We must invent a 
new conceptual system that…confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, and 
introduces perceptions that cannot form part of the existing perceptual world” (1975, 22-3). 
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Without going into the details of Feyerabend’s views on counterinduction and their 
philosophical reception, I want to consider the specific role of story telling in successful 
counterinductions. Feyerabend writes that 
the whole rich reservoir of the everyday experience and of the intuition of [Galileo’s] 
readers is utilized in [his] argument, but the facts which they are invited to recall are 
arranged in a new way, approximations are made, known effects are omitted, different 
conceptual lines are drawn, so that a new kind of experience arises, manufactured 
almost out of thin air. This new experience is then solidified by insinuating that the 
reader has been familiar with it all the time…[Galileo] established fake connections 
with the perceptual elements of this cosmology which are only now being replaced by 
genuine theories (physiological optics, theory of continua), and that whenever possible 
he replaced old facts by a new type of experience which he simply invented for the 
purpose of supporting Copernicus. (1975, 121) 
Galileo’s TEs produce imagined experiences that create new natural interpretations, and then 
work out the consequences of these new natural interpretations for physical theory. But more 
than this, they give the impression that the new experiences and theory are indeed very 
natural, even obvious. They do this “by tricks, jokes, and non-sequiturs” (1975, 115) and 
other methods which we would (then and now) consider “irrational.” They are good stories 
because they are interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent and surprising. 
But how do they work? One way concerns an assumed “naturalness,” which Feyerabend 
characterizes with Hume in terms of habit and acculturation. Galileo has to “defuse” old 
Aristotelian habits and “enthrone” new Copernican ones (1975, 77). When performing 
Galileo’s TEs “we have the impression that this readiness was in us all the time, although it 
took some effort to make it conscious. This impression is most certainly erroneous: it is the 
result of Galileo’s propagandistic machinations” (1975, 72). 
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Why think that it is the propagandistic elements of Galileo’s stories that cause the conceptual 
change, and not something else? “‘Experience’, i.e. the totality of all facts from all domains, 
cannot force us to carry out the change which Galileo wants to introduce. The motive for a 
change must come from a different source” (1975, 71). As we will see, this change does not 
come from logic either, but our desire to see “the whole [correspond] to its parts with 
wonderful simplicity” (Galileo quoting Copernicus, 1975, 71). The desire for simplicity and 
coherence is a desire that is satisfied by stories. Of course it is also satisfied by mathematical 
axioms. But we desire more than just simplicity and coherence.  
Once it has been realized that a close empirical fit is no virtue and that it must be 
relaxed in times of change, then style, elegance of expression, simplicity of 
presentation, tension of plot and narrative, and seductiveness of content become 
important features of our knowledge. They give life to what is said and help us to 
overcome the resistance of the observational material. They create and maintain 
interest in a theory that has been partly removed from the observational plane and 
would be inferior to its rivals when judged by the customary standards. It is in this 
context that much of Galileo’s work should be seen. This work has often been likened 
to propaganda - and propaganda it certainly is. But propaganda of this kind is not a 
marginal affair that surrounds allegedly more substantial means of defence, and that 
should perhaps be avoided by the ‘professionally honest scientist’. In the 
circumstances we are considering now, propaganda is of the essence. It is of the 
essence because interest must be created at a time when the usual methodological 
prescriptions have no point of attack; and because this interest must be maintained, 
perhaps for centuries, until new reasons arrive. (1975, 118) 
Galileo’s TEs are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and 
instigate a new one through the use of propaganda to change our habits. Changing the habits 
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of others using only words is hard; it requires appealing to the audience’s sense of what is 
interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent and surprising. This position does 
not necessarily reduce to subjectivist or relativist epistemologies of science insofar as some of 
the success conditions of stories are objective (perhaps coherence, revealing the truth, etc.). Is 
this a new or useful position? Let’s see how it connects with recent work on TEs. 
3 Feyerabend in the Current Context 
It would be interesting to compare Feyerabend’s views with earlier views on TEs, but for 
considerations of space I will focus only on two connections to the contemporary literature.10 
First, Feyerabend’s account of stories provides a new set of arguments against John D. 
Norton’s account of TEs, according to which the epistemology of TEs/stories is exhausted by 
examining their logical reconstructions (Norton 1991, 1996, 2004a, 2004b). Second, while no 
                                                     
10 Historical connections would certainly include Mach, Popper and Kuhn. One perhaps 
unexpected connection is to Lichtenberg’s earlier work on “experiments with thoughts and 
ideas.” Whether Feyerabend read Lichtenberg, we can only guess. But here are three 
tantalizing links. One important (and Feyerabendian) purpose of TEs, for Lichtenberg, is to 
“think up new errors.” Second, for Lichtenberg, TEs “are not a method in the strict sense of a 
path to knowledge, but the best we can do without a method of scientific creativity” (quoted 
in Fehige and Stuart 2014, 183). This is echoed by Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchy. 
Finally, for Lichtenberg, observation is mediated by concepts whose meanings can become 
“frozen” and stagnant, and TEs can “melt” such concepts by breaking the rules of grammar, 
forcing together ideas that do not naturally come together, or forcing naturally conjoined ideas 
apart. This parallels Feyerabend’s idea that TEs “tear down large pieces of common idiom” 
and revise language to reverse natural interpretations (Hoyningen-Huene 2006, 630). 
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one who currently focusses on the narrative component of TEs makes reference to 
Feyerabend, we can fruitfully re-cast Feyerabend’s work as part of that tradition. 
Reconstructing TEs 
John D. Norton claims that thought experiments are just arguments. He argues that all TEs 
can be reconstructed as sets of propositions with logical connections between them. We 
evaluate the reliability of TEs by reconstructing them this way, and if there was a TE that we 
couldn’t reconstruct, we wouldn’t think it was reliable. Thus, we should identify TEs as 
arguments, and pursue the epistemology of thought experiments as the epistemology of 
arguments. We do this by identifying and evaluating TEs using logic, which is our general 
tool for categorizing and explaining the epistemological justification that the premises of an 
argument lend to its conclusion. 
Feyerabend would strongly object to Norton’s account. When his assistants in Berlin wanted 
to “learn how to think” they bought logic textbooks. Feyerabend was outraged, “as if logic has 
anything to do with that” (1995 132). For Feyerabend, the introduction of logical 
reconstructions into philosophy of science tends merely to create “intellectual tumors grown 
by philosophers.” Instead of clarifying, they translate science into “some form of pidgin 
logic” (1995, 142) as a way of avoiding real problems. “One would have thought that the 
philosopher of science would be most interested in picking out and analysing in detail those 
moves which are necessary for the advancement of science. Such moves, I have tried to show, 
often resist rational reconstruction” (1975, 116 fn. 9). 
More substantially, we can extrapolate at least four distinct arguments from Feyerabend 
against Norton’s account. The first focuses on clarification, which is one of the supposed 
benefits of logically reconstructing a TE. Feyerabend asks whether this is really a benefit.  
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To ‘clarify’ the terms of a discussion does not mean to study the additional and as yet 
unknown properties of the domain in question which one needs to make them fully 
understood, it means to fill them with existing notions from the entirely different 
domain of logic and common sense, preferably observational ideas, until they sound 
common themselves, and to take care that the process of filling obeys the accepted 
laws of logic. The discussion is permitted to proceed only after its initial steps have 
been modified in this manner. So the course of an investigation is deflected into the 
narrow channels of things already understood and the possibility of fundamental 
conceptual discovery (or of fundamental conceptual change) is considerably reduced. 
(1975 193) 
For Feyerabend, clarification converts the object of our investigation into something 
common-sounding which fits into familiar logical schemata. This does not reveal anything 
new about it. Rather, it mutilates it into something less interesting.  
A second criticism focuses on Norton’s identification of good TEs as logic-approved 
arguments. For Feyerabend, TEs can be counterinductive, meaning they defend hypotheses 
“in the face of plain and unambiguous refuting facts” (1975, 113). This would make them 
unsound, at least relative to contemporary knowledge. And because it can take centuries 
before the fruits of a new idea are fully harvested, “the inventor of a new world-view…must 
be able to talk nonsense until the amount of nonsense created by him and his friends is big 
enough to give sense to all its parts” (1975, 194). If “talking nonsense” involves breaking 
contemporary rules of valid reasoning (perhaps to be rescued in the future by new rules of 
valid reasoning), this is what they must do (1978, 117). Perhaps this is why “logical principles 
not only play a much smaller role in the (argumentative and non-argumentative) moves that 
advance science, but that the attempt to enforce them would seriously impede science” (1975, 
197). Thus, “the barren and illiterate logician” is one “who preaches to [scientists] about the 
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virtues of clarity, consistency…tightness of argument…and so on,” while the right thing to do 
is for the scientist to disobey that logician and “imitate his predecessors in his own field who 
advanced by breaking most of the rules logicians want to lay on him” (1975, 197). 
A third criticism begins by asking which logic defines the quality of TEs. Different logics 
exist, and they will sometimes disagree about the logical quality of particular TEs. 
Occasionally Norton allows that we might have to wait for a future logic in cases where 
current logic cannot decide. But this assumes a future where only one “logic myth” reigns. 
Feyerabend would urge against any such future, since the domination of a single myth would 
entail the cessation of progress in logic. In a healthy state of logic there will be more than one 
myth, and in this case we will not be able to decide which TEs are good or bad in any 
objective sense, again, because there will be different and competing logics which will 
disagree about the quality of some TEs. 
Lastly, Feyerabend claims that logic is not a top-down practice separate from science. Logic 
can judge the practice of thought experimenting, but logicians can also use TEs to judge this 
or that logic. In the final analysis, there is only one practice (1975, 232). This view is now 
called “anti-exceptionalism” about logic, and for Feyerabend, it tells against any view, like 
Norton’s, which attempts to outsource the epistemology of scientific reasoning to logic. If we 
take such outsourcing seriously, then logical reconstruction is how we should evaluate all 
inferences. But then, to actually evaluate an inference, we need its logical reconstruction, and 
then a logical reconstruction of the thinking of the logicians who reconstructed it, and then 
reconstructions of the inferences made by those who reconstructed the logicians’ reasoning, 
ad infinitum (1975, 224). 
To avoid this regress, Feyerabend suggests looking at actual scientific (and logical) practice 
anthropologically. “Things change when we use scientific practice or cultural reality and not 
logic as our informants, in other words, when we engage in sociological research, not in 
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reconstruction. We then discover that scientific concepts…are ambiguous in the sense that 
decisive events can affect their appearance, their perceived implications and, with them, the 
‘logic’ they obey” (1975, 208). This accords well with those philosophers and cognitive 
scientists who study TEs by looking inside the classroom and laboratory (for a summary of 
such work see Hadzigeorgiou 2016; Stuart 2017). 
The Philosophy of Stories 
Let’s take Feyerabend’s positive suggestion seriously and investigate the stories told by 
scientists as an anthropologist would. Feyerabend’s general idea – that open-ended dialogical 
styles can expose confusions and dogma while other styles (like lectures) create dogma – can 
be found in thinkers ranging from Plato to Zen Buddhists.11 But the particular notion that 
science has a narrative component that is necessary and cannot be captured by logical 
reconstruction, seems to originate with Feyerabend (at least in the “analytic” tradition of 
philosophy of science).12  
I cannot identify anyone currently working on narrative in science, whether in philosophy, 
history, cognitive science, or science education that makes reference to Feyerabend. Yet his 
ideas should be seen as an important precursor of work that is now flourishing. For example, 
                                                     
11 E.g., when stories in Zen “are detached from the actual situation and written down in a text 
as encounter dialogues, the situationality of the story dissipates and the cases themselves turn 
into dead language that inspires a chain of interpretations” (Park 2002, 224). 
12 A possible counterexample is Hans Vaihinger, who had claimed that invented fictions were 
necessary for thought and science (Vaihinger 1911, 134). However, for Vaihinger, fictions are 
constructs (like THE THING IN ITSELF or GOD), not stories. Feyerabend also speaks of fictions 
as objects, like point masses or incompressible fluids (1963). In any case, such fictions need 
not figure into a story, as stories may be fictional or non-fictional. 
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Nancy Nersessian was probably the first to explore the narrative form of TEs in depth (1991a, 
1991b, 1992a, 1992b), and she did so using the tools of history, philosophy, and cognitive 
science. Nersessian insists, just as Feyerabend did, that we must use the methods of cognitive 
science to understand how the narrative framing of a TE affects its epistemological powers 
without resorting to logical reconstruction. 
For Nersessian, TEs are dynamical mental models that scientists create, run, and draw 
inferences from. They have a narrative form, which is created separately, and which enables 
others to perform the same cognitive actions as their creator. The narrative “calls upon the 
reader/listener to imagine a dynamic scene” (1992b, 295) and gives instructions that govern 
what will take place in the imagination. “In constructing and conducting the experiment, we 
use inferencing mechanisms, existing representations, and scientific and general world 
knowledge to make realistic transformations from one possible physical state to the next” 
(1992b, 297).13  
Peter Swirski explicitly follows Nersessian’s lead, using results from cognitive science to 
argue that we think in stories rather than through formal analysis (2007, 111). Stories are 
emotionally and rhetorically powerful, and are remembered and understood more easily than 
formal presentations of information.  
One extension of Feyerabend’s insight concerns the variable powers of different kinds of 
stories. For example, Swirski points out that texts employing symmetries like rhyme, meter 
and alliteration are more powerful than their less catchy cousins (2007, 112). Given that 
                                                     
13 Nersessian’s suggestion here is comparable to one made also by Kendal Walton, which has 
since been used by others to focus on how a story’s text constrains what can and should be 
imagined in the TE (Walton 1990; for development see Meynell 2014, 2018; Salis and Frigg 
2020). 
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scientists are now explicitly telling stories to make their findings digestible,14 an interesting 
question to ask is: what, if anything, would scientists gain (or lose) by employing these 
symmetries as well? Could we use the tricks of these trades to create stronger TEs? 
I’ll close this section with another, perhaps more radical direction that the current literature on 
narrative in science could take from Feyerabend. This concerns the use of stories to increase 
the human aspect of science. Scientific publications often portray scientific results as 
produced objectively, as if by science itself. This can be frustrating to students, who can feel 
that they are being discouraged from imagining (Stuart 2019). The later Feyerabend was 
deeply invested in “the human need for mystery, reverence, and love” (Martin 2016, 129), 
believing these to be essential for both science and human happiness. Since explicitly literary 
styles are a more “human” way to pursue knowledge, perhaps lurking here is a new argument 
for the intentional inclusion of story-telling in science. Rather than the usual cognitive-
epistemic argument for the use of narrative in science, we here receive an ethical/political 
argument: TEs and stories should be used in science for ethical reasons, to make it more 
human. 
4 Conclusion 
I have tried to show that Feyerabend has much to offer those interested in TEs, and I am 
confident that more historical research into Feyerabend’s later writings could further inform 
current debates. I close the paper with a number of questions that this historical study has 
prompted for me.  
                                                     
14 E.g., a recent paper written by climate scientists argues that telling stories is more efficient 
for conveying the concrete implications of a warmer climate to others (see Shepherd et al 
2018). 
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 Suppose TEs can, and occasionally should, function through ignorance, 
“pigheadedness” (1975, 197), prejudice, lies, and propaganda. Does this imply that we 
can only identify and account for successful TEs of this kind from a future, 
backwards-looking standpoint?  
 Feyerabend’s claim that we should approach science anthropologically could be taken 
even more seriously in the context of TEs. For example, who gets to produce TEs, and 
when? How are funding, patronage and social norms (e.g., those maintaining 
laboratory power hierarchies) involved? 
 The modern debate on TEs focuses on how TEs produce new knowledge. But 
knowledge isn’t the only epistemic desiderata that stories can produce – there is also 
understanding, which is the more natural product of narrative explanations (Morgan 
and Wise 2017). How would an epistemology of TEs that focused on understanding 
rather than knowledge (e.g., Elgin 2014; Stuart 2016, 2018; Wiltsche forthcoming) 
cohere with Feyerabend’s epistemology? 
 Feyerabend sees a continuum between science, philosophy and art. “Rationality is 
either defined in a narrow way that excludes, say, the arts; then it also excludes large 
sections of the sciences. Or it is defined in a way that lets all of science survive; then it 
also applies to love-making, comedy and dogfights. There is no way of delimiting 
‘science’ by something stronger and more coherent than a list” (1975, 246). If this is 
true, do stories overturn myths in philosophy and art as well, and are there differences 
in the ways they achieve this? 
 Modern authors who write on TEs typically take Kuhn to be the starting point of the 
modern debate, since he focused on TEs in scientific revolutions and framed the 
central epistemic question (Stuart et al 2018, 9). But the modern debate about the 
epistemology of TEs could have started with Feyerabend instead. Here is the 
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beginning of a potentially fruitful TE: what kind of debate would we have now, if that 
had happened? 
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